This paper attempts to provide a probable answer to a longstanding resource curse puzzle; i.e., why resource-rich nations grow at a slower rate compared with less fortunate ones. Using an innovative threshold estimation technique, the empirical results reveal that there is a threshold effect in the natural resources-economic growth relationship. We find that the impact of natural resources is meaningful to economic growth only after a certain threshold point of institutional quality has been attained. The results also shed light on the fact that the nations that have low institutional quality depend heavily on natural resources while countries with high quality institutions are relatively less dependent on natural resources to generate growth.
Introduction
We suppose natural resource-rich countries enjoy better economic growth compared with those countries that are less fortunate. Surprisingly, everyday experiences and empirical studies show the reverse (Frankel, 2010) . It seems that an abundance of natural resources is detrimental to economic growth. This puzzling phenomenon is known as the natural resource curse (NRC) hypothesis, and the literature provides at least three theories explaining the NCR: Dutch disease models, rent seeking models, and institutional explanations (Sachs & Warner, 1995 .
While empirical evidence from the last two decades consistently show the prevalence of the NRC (Gylfason, 2001; Gylfason & Zoega 2002; Leite & Weidmann 1999 ; among others), more recently studies have found new and contradicting empirical evidence to the existing NRC literature, demonstrating that an abundance of natural resources evidently has a positive relationship on economic growth as well as economic welfare (for instance, Boyce & Emery, 2011; Brunnschweiler, 2008; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009 ). Using two new variables from the World Bank database, namely the total natural capital and subsoil wealth, Brunnschweiler (2008) finds a positive and robust relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth for more than 90 economies. Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby (2005) and Frankel (2010) argue that the probable reason for inconsistency in the empirical findings by previous researchers could be the different type of resources, either point or diffuse, and different economic backgrounds in the areas of level of human capital, level of debt overhang, and export diversification. Brunnschweiler (2008) postulates that the inconsistencies in the empirical finding originate from the inappropriateness of resource abundance measurement to proxy natural resources in the empirical estimation.
Interestingly, the two outwardly contradicting groups who investigate the NRC hypothesis unanimously agree on the importance of good institutions. It is found that economies with abundant natural resources, and at the same time better institutional quality and governance, such as strong democratic accountability, high law and order, lower corruption, or higher integration among government institutions have better economic growth and higher human welfare (Damania & Bulte, 2003; Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006) . This is because superior institutional quality could be very effective in nullifying the curse through avoidance of rent-seeking behavior (Auty, 2001) , reducing corruption (Isham et al., 2005; Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier, 2006) , lowering the risk of violent civil conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005) , and accelerating efficient resource allocation (Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003) .
Previous studies that delve into the institutional quality and resource curse hypothesis have imposed an important a priori restriction in their analysis, i.e., the impact of natural resource and institutional quality variables is set to be linear and monotonic to economic growth. However, the relationship might be nonlinear, and only after a certain level of institution quality or any of its interaction terms will natural resources effectively contribute to economic growth. In other words, there may be a point only after a certain threshold of institutional quality at which the natural resources could have a meaningful contribution to the economic growth. Therefore, this research affirms a possible answer to the NRC hypothesis puzzle. If natural resource abundance is indeed detrimental to economic growth, it might be true only at a low quality of institution. As institutional quality improves, the impact of natural resources on economic growth may be momentous. If so, policy makers should struggle to archive a high level of institutional quality. However, this raises another question: how high should institutional quality be for natural resources to have a favorable effect on economic growth? At what level of institutional quality is the curse annulled? Answering such questions constitutes the prime motivation of this paper. In doing so, this paper examines the relationship between natural resources and economic growth by considering the threshold level of institutional quality using the Brunnschweiler (2008) dataset. Specifically, the questions addressed in this paper are as follows.
(1) Why are the empirical findings on the issues of NRC hypothesis far from conclusive? This research offers analysis that favors the importance of high institutional quality and good governance that could provide an answer to the NRC puzzle. (2) Are different levels of institutional quality inherent in the economy contributors to the NRC effect? This study attempts to answer this second question by offering a threshold level at which the effect of natural resources on economic growth is positive or otherwise. In other words, is there any threshold level of institutional quality above which natural resources affect the economic growth rate differently? This paper employs relatively new econometric methods for threshold estimation and inference, as proposed by Hansen (1996 Hansen ( , 2000 .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the theory and recent evidence of the NCR hypothesis and institutions. Section 3 describes the dataset used in the empirical analysis and the layout of the econometric procedures. Section 4 discusses the estimation results, and, finally, Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
Institutions and Natural Resource Curse Hypothesis
Economists generally agree that poor or good results from any growth policies are largely dependent on the level of institutional quality inherent in the economy (Barro, 1991; North, 1994) . Regardless of how good the policy is or how many resources they have, if the institutions -either public or private -are not accommodating, then the desired results from such good resource policy will shatter. Nelson and Sampat (2001) technically define institutions as 'social technologies' that are positively related to economic performance. They postulate that, when institutions are of low quality, owing to frequent changes of rules, high levels of corruption, widespread nepotism, and weak law enforcement, the markets will not function well and may lead to high market volatility, and then the efficient allocation of resources may be severely affected. In contrast, high-quality market characteristics play an important role in promoting an efficient and low-risk investment opportunity that could be vital to providing a better environment for sustainable economic growth. Ji, Magnus, and Wang (2012) argue that an important factor that impacts on the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth is the quality of institutions. Improvement of institutional quality is more helpful to the development of many non-resource sectors than the development of resource sectors, so that better institutions make resources become less important. Thus, the correlation between the economy and non-resource sectors is stronger than the correlation between the economy and resource abundance; and one can notice a decreasing and insignificant effect of resource abundance when institutional quality increases. When institutional quality exceeds a certain level, the positive impact of resource abundance on economic growth increases as institutional quality improves. Apparently, the countries with strong institutional quality and abundant natural resources are likely to make good use of these resources and revenues. In a different manner, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) show that natural resource abundance may have negative effects on development when weak institutions allow resource profits to be spent in government consumption rather than investment, especially in countries with low levels of genuine saving. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) argue that a low-quality institution through which natural resources are channeled to an economic activity could aggravate information asymmetries and adversely affect resource allocation efficiency if used by the perverse politician. Consequently, the decision made by the authority might be politically rational but economically inefficient. On the other hand, high-quality institutions could provide an efficient means for channeling information about market conditions and participants by facilitating mutual cooperation between market actors that could eventually reduce transaction costs and increase efficiency. Therefore, institutions could act as a tool that reverses the negative association between natural resource wealth and poor outcomes. As Leite and Weidmann (1999) stated, good institutional arrangement is also crucial to the management of optimal and efficient resources. 1 Mehlum et al. (2006) explain that the high-quality institution is one that is producer friendly and not grabber friendly. In a similar argument, they divide institutions into two categories. The first group includes the institutions that are grabber friendly and the second group includes those that are producer friendly. These researchers conjecture that the curse is only effective under a grabberfriendly institution and not for the latter. If the institution is producer friendly, then resource-rich countries are hypothesized to attract more producers to involve in production and then eventually increase growth; this is not the case for grabberfriendly institutions. Upon empirically testing the hypothesis for 87 countries, their result favors the idea that producer-friendly institutions could reduce significantly the effect of the resource curse. Further, they find that countries such as the US, Canada, Norway, and Australia are curse-free and enjoy high economic growth due to their producer-friendly institutions of exceptionally high quality (Larsen, 2005) . However, the study of Mehlum et al. (2006) does not clearly differentiate between good qualities that are associated with the producer-friendly institutions and those associated with the grabber-friendly ones.
Empirical Model
The empirical model is based on Brunnschweiler (2008) , in which the empirical linkages between natural resources and growth use the following linear cross-country growth equation:
where RGDPC i is the real GDP per capita in country i, R i is the country's natural resource abundance, INS is institutional quality, X is a vector of controls (initial income per capita, latitude), and ε i is a noise term. Since we use logs, the effect of natural resources on real GDP per capita is expressed as elasticity.
Our hypothesis is that the impact of resource abundance on economic growth depends whether a country obtained a certain level of institutional quality or not. Accordingly, the indication of a resource curse only appears for countries with inferior institutions; while the indication of a resource curse vanishes for countries with better institutions.
To test the hypothesis, we argue that equation (2) is particularly well suited to capture the presence of contingency effects and to offer a rich way of modeling the influence of institutional quality on the impact of natural resources in economic growth. The model, based on threshold regression, takes the following form:
where INS (i.e., level of institutional development) is the threshold variable used to split the sample into regimes or groups, and λ is the unknown threshold parameter. This type of modeling strategy allows the role of natural resources to differ depending on whether institutions are below or above some unknown level of λ.
In this equation, institutions act as sample-splitting (or threshold) variables. The impact of natural resources on real GDP per capita will be β 1 1 and β 2 1 for countries with a low or high regime, respectively. It is obvious that, under the hypothesis β 1 = β 2 , the model becomes linear and reduces to equation (1).
The first step of our estimation is to test the null hypothesis of linearity H 0 : β 1 = β 2 against the threshold model in equation (2). We follow Hansen (1996 Hansen ( , 2000 , who suggests a heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange Multiplier (LM) bootstrap procedure to test the null hypothesis of a linear formulation against a threshold regression alternative. Since the threshold parameter λ is not identified under the null hypothesis of the no-threshold effect, the p values are computed by a fixed bootstrap method. Hansen (2000) shows that this procedure yields asymptotically correct p values. It is important to note that, if the hypothesis of β 1 = β 2 is rejected and a threshold level is identified, we should test again the threshold regression model against a linear specification after dividing the original sample according to the threshold thus identified. This procedure is carried out until the null of β 1 = β 2 can no longer be rejected.
Even though natural resources may have a positive effect on growth, the results may have been driven by resource-rich countries with high institutional quality. In order to examine this possibility, equation (2) is extended as follows to include an interaction term between institutions and natural resources:
If α 3 is negative and statistically significant, this implies that the negative growth effect increases as institutional quality improves. On the other hand, if α 3 is positive and significant, this indicates that the negative growth effect diminishes as institutional quality improves. Equation (3) is estimated using the threshold regression technique. From this framework, the partial impact of an increase in natural resource abundance on growth can be derived as follows:
The resource curse hypothesis implies that α 1 > 0 while the view that good institutions help alleviate the resource curse implies that α 2 < 0. The resource curse will be completely eliminated (i.e. α 1 + α 2 INS i ≥ 0) when institutional quality is greater than the required threshold which is equal to −α 1 /α 2 .
The Data
This study employs cross-country estimations in order to estimate equation (2). The number of countries is 90, and the sample period spans from 1984 to 2005. Following Brunnschweiler (2008), three natural resource indicators are employed in the analysis, namely (i) primary exports over GDP (sxp); (ii) average total natural capital (natcap) -this measure includes subsoil assets, timber resources, non-timber forest recourses, protected areas, cropland, and pastureland; and (iii) average subsoil assets (subsoil) -this measure includes energy resources and other mineral resources. Among the three measures it seems that the share of primary exports over GDP is less credible. As Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue, this ratio is more appropriately thought of as a measure of dependence (or intensity) than as a measure of abundance. They further asserted that, for this measure, the denominator explicitly measures the magnitude of other activities in the economy. Consequently, the scaling exercise -dividing by the size of the economy -implies that the ratio variable is not independent of economic policies and the institutions that produce them. Moreover, not only the scale of economic activity, but also the comparative advantage in non-resource sectors is to a large extent determined by government choices (Clarida & Findlay 1992) . Hence, the resource dependence ratio potentially suffers from endogeneity problems, and perhaps should not be treated as an exogenous explanatory variable at all in growth regressions. Rather, it is the outcome of specific institutional settings (Brunnschweiler & Bulte 2008) . In regards to the other two measures, i.e. average total natural capital and (natcap) and average subsoil assets (subsoil), the resource curse literature most often -implicitly if not explicitly -considers oil and other mineral resources when talking about resources and growth. So between the two measures the average subsoil assets (subsoil) is probably the most appropriate.
The sxp dataset is obtained from Sachs and Warner (1995) , whereas the natcap and subsoil dataset are gathered from World Bank. The institutions dataset employed is from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a monthly publication of Political Risk Services (PRS). In this study, four PRS indicators were used to measure the overall institutional environment: (i) corruption, which measures excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservation, 'favor-for-favors,' secret-party funding, and suspicious ties between politics and business. It is hypothesized that a high level of corruption distorts the economic and financial environment and reduces the efficiency of the government and businesses by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability. The index ranges between zero and six; the higher the corruption, the lower the index; (ii) rule of law, which reveals the degree to which citizens are willing to accept established institutions to make and implement laws and to adjudicate disputes; (iii) bureaucratic quality, which represents autonomy from political pressure, strength, and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services, as well as the existence of an established mechanism for recruitment and training of bureaucrats; and (iv) government effectiveness, which measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. These four variables were scaled from 0 to 6, where higher values implied better institutional quality and vice versa. The real GDP per capita is expressed in US$ at constant 2000 prices, and latitude is the location of the country. All dataset are obtained from World Development Indicators.
Results
Equation (2) has been estimated using four different models depending on the institution indicator used (Model A: Rule of Law; Model B: Government Effect; Model C: Corruption; and Model D: Bureaucratic Quality). We employ the splitting sample threshold method from Hansen (1996 Hansen ( , 2000 to investigate the NRC hypothesis with three different measures of natural resources, namely the share of resources export to GDP (sxp) as in Sachs and Warner (1995) , total natural capital (natcap) and subsoil wealth (subsoil) as used by Brunnschweiler (2008) .
The results of each model are presented in Tables 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c). The letters a, b, and c refer to an estimation using the share of natural resource export to GDP (sxp), total natural capital (natcap) and subsoil wealth (subsoil), respectively. The number 2 refers to the estimation of equation (3) with an interaction of natural resources and institutional quality while number 1 is without an interaction term.
This study has revealed several interesting results. First, the result shows (as shown in Tables 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c), or 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c)) that the p-value of the hypothesis of the no threshold effect as computed by a bootstrap method with 1000 replications and 15% trimming percentage are rejected at a very highly significant level with and without the interaction term irrespective of the models. The finding clearly indicates that the relationship between economic growth and natural resources is non-linear, and therefore the imposition of a priori monotonic restrictions on the relationship can be misleading. The finding provides a better explanation for a dynamic rich relationship between natural resources and economic growth. Natural resources can effectively contribute to economic growth only after a certain level of institution quality or any of its interaction terms. Second, the presence of a threshold level also indicates that the sample can be split into two different groups depending on the level of institutional quality. Any country that has an institutional quality less than the threshold level is considered a low-quality institution, while one with quality greater than the threshold values is classified as a high-quality institution. The behaviors of the relationships between natural resources and economic growth are different for low-and high-quality institutions. For instance, Table 1(c) depicts that the hypothesis of NRC is rejected at a lower level of institutional quality for Models A, B, C, and D. The coefficients of the subsoil variable for these models are 0.532, 0.505, 0.520, and 0.549, respectively, and significant at the 5% level at least. However, as institutions get better (above the threshold level) the contribution of natural resources is negligible. Another example is found in Table 2 (a) where, at a lower level of government effect (<0.47), the coefficient of β 1 1 is −34.1, while at a higher level (>0.47) of government integrity, the results dramatically change to only −9.47.
In addition, the regression's result from equation (3) has provided new insight into the understanding of the resource curse. For instance, Table 2 (a) Model B shows that the global as well as the threshold regression coefficient for natural resources is negative, thus confirming the NRC hypothesis. However, interestingly, the interaction term between natural resources and institutional quality from the regression is positive and significant. The negative coefficient of natural resources and the positive coefficient of the interaction term is a sign of the NRC getting weaker as the government effect gets stronger. If the government effect reached the 1.342 level, than it will cancel out the effect of the resource curse. Out of 90 countries, our sample shows that 64 countries have sufficient institutional quality to insulate the economy from the resource curse.
Additionally, we find that the choice of measurement for resource abundance is very important in determining the relationship between growth and resource abundance. In regard to the three measures of resource abundance, perhaps less weight should be given to the share of the export of natural resource over GDP, as it capture resources dependence rather than resource abundance, and the effect of these two concepts on economic growth is not necessarily the same (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008) . One measure that typifies the abundance of resource abundance is the subsoil indicator. This is because the resource curse literature most often -implicitly if not explicitly -considers oil and other mineral resources when talking about resources and growth. So between the other measures, subsoil and natcap, the subsoil assets one is probably the most appropriate.
Moreover, the relationship between growth and resource abundance is also sensitive to the different aspects of institutional quality and their strength. Variation in the results from four measures indicates that different aspects of institutional quality are imperative in determining the impact of resource abundance on economic growth. This is because the different institutional characteristics are not identical, although they might be related. Therefore, evaluation of these four institutional frameworks for their effects on economic growth requires a separate assessment of each. When an identical sample of countries is used, we find that the democratic aspect of institutions does play a superior role in determining the impact of resource abundance on economic growth.
It is imperative to note that the results from the above regression of growth and institutions may suffer from the endogeneity problem due to missing some variables that co-explained the resource-institutions nexus. In fact, many studies have demonstrated that resource abundance has a negative association with institutional quality (Bulte & Damania, 2005; Hodler, 2006; Isham et al., 2005; Leite & Weidmann 1999; Ross 1999 Ross , 2001 Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003 , among others) through lack of integrity, rampant cases of corruption and disrespect of law. All these inappropriate behaviors are an outcome of rent seeking behavior among the authorities. However, the result from our threshold regression is the same dataset and the specification as in the Sachs and Warner (1995) and Brunnscheiler (2008) . Specifically Brunnschweiler (2008) has demonstrated that the results of simple OLS and the endogeneity corrected 2SLS are not much different in the sign of the coefficients and their significant level with respect to different specifications. Both results are equally valid. In this case, we are just retesting the same dataset to provide new evidence on the non-monotonocity relationship between resources and economic growth.
Conclusion
In this paper, we re-examine the well-known empirical puzzle of the resource curse hypothesis using a threshold regression with reference to different institutional quality. In particular, we endogenously determine the threshold level of institutional quality and then use this threshold point to test the different effects of natural resources on economic growth at low-institutional quality in comparison with natural resources within high-institutional quality countries.
There are several major findings in this paper. First, a priori monotonic restriction on the study of NRC could lead to a premature conclusion. In this study, we consistently fail to reject the presence of the threshold effect in the estimation regardless of models. Furthermore, the study highlights the importance of the good quality of the institution to neutralize the effect of the natural resource curse. Resource policy will be effective only under a good institution. Resourceabundant countries that have weak institutional quality will not be better off in terms of economic growth compared with resource-poor economies. Further, this study also shows that a high-quality institution nation is less dependent on the natural resources to generate economic growth.
In summary, a nation desiring to benefit fully from its natural resources should not neglect the important role of good institutions for a sustainable economic growth, and with good institutions, the NCR puzzle can also be challenged.
